I began the pre-typesetting read of my book — all 183,000 words of it — a fortnight ago, and immediately relived the never-ending malarkey with the Introduction… Even this late in the day I found myself tweaking the opening paragraph for the twenty-first time. But suddenly this final revisitation seemed to focus for me the underlying issues.
The reason I had eight willing but long-suffering friends read and advise me on this Introduction was that there is a fictive-creative element in this book, it’s not just facts and non-fiction, and I find it impossible to write about something creative that I have created, because if I could have written about it I wouldn’t have created it. In fact I don’t believe one should try to write about something one has created. It’s like trying to describe the self. The self can’t do it. Secretly, I felt that someone else should write the Introduction; but I knew that the convention was against me there and I couldn’t defy it. I compromised by appointing a sort of committee.
The readers’ initial reaction was, quite rightly, that I was not selling George strongly enough from word one, and they suggested various ‘commercial’ angles, most of which I adopted. One reader even rewrote the whole Introduction from what can only, I’m afraid, be called a clichéd marketing point of view, and I even adopted some of that. As I drafted and redrafted, more and more of my readers approved of the result.
Then came the bombshell. I showed the Introduction in this ‘late’ form to one of the most respected and experienced senior literary figures in London, whom I had known for a while and will call Q. His embarrassment, poor chap, was acute. He repeatedly asked me whether I ‘minded’ him telling me this, but the Introduction was fundamentally wrong, a total disaster, because ‘it’s about you, Patrick, it’s all about you’. I did not mind him telling me this, quite the contrary, but it was something I was extremely sensitive about. Also, I couldn’t help wondering why the other readers hadn’t said something similar. Had they been afraid to? However, I knew that in literary terms Q’s opinion outweighed all the rest, so I profusely thanked him, tore the Introduction up, and started yet again.
I could see that it came down to two extremes of Introduction, a ‘solipsistic’ and a ‘non-solipsistic’. The first tells how the author ‘discovered’ his/her subject, what that subject ‘means’ to the author, why he/she feels the subject’s story must be told, why he/she has told the story this way, etc. The second is focussed from word one on the subject of the biography and basically, as they say, ‘sells’ the subject of the biography as hard as it can; the author is discreet, reverential and practically self-effaced.
Well, reading the Introduction this last time before the proofs, I suddenly saw that even if the ‘committee’ had not criticised the Introduction for being solipsistic, i.e. ‘about you, Patrick, rather than George Calderon’, the pull of all their advice had been in the non-solipsistic direction: ‘get his achievement into the opening words’, ‘mention famous contemporaries/friends in the first ten lines’, ‘get the War into the first paragraph’, ‘get stuck into the romance/sex on page one’, ‘rabbit about the Edwardians, who are flavour of the decade’, ‘drop famous names all over the place and make a person casually reading the first sentence believe he/she will be ignorant and deeply unfashionable if they don’t buy the book’. So my re-jigging in those directions had been a substantial move away from me.
But equally, I felt I could see why Q’s response had been so extreme. He surely had little experience of biographies of unknown people. Obviously, if you are writing a biography of someone extremely well known, it would be ludicrous to drag yourself into it (although I daresay even Peter Ackroyd allows himself a bit about what Shakespeare means to him). Yet how someone ‘discovers’ an unknown, what the unknown means to them, and how they came to write his/her life, are profoundly significant: without them, the book would never have been written and they are surely a vital part of the ‘sell’ of the book. Several readers told me as much; they enjoyed reading the ‘personal’ story behind it all. I was hyper-sensitive about the solipsistic element in my Introduction, because I am aware of the parallels between my and George’s experiences of Russia, our involvement with Chekhov, and Russia-related career difficulties. On the other hand, how I first came across George when I was a literary consultant at the National Theatre, my originally negative reaction, my deeper delving after being commissioned to research the history of Chekhov on the British stage, my ‘discovery’ of George and Kittie’s archives, and my realisation of what vibrant people they were, are surely vital to ‘introducing’ the Calderons?
I think I have now got the balance right between the ‘solipsistic’ and ‘non-solipsistic’ in my Introduction, although I fear there will still be too much there about me for Q and some other readers (but the whole book is about other people!). The underlying issue, I see now, is this: biography is not entirely about its subject, or at least it’s about its subject in a peculiar way, because it is the product of a me reacting with that subject. Whether obtrusively or not, the relation of every biographer to his/her subject pervades the whole of the biography he/she has written. As an example, I take the beautiful biography of Edward Lear by Jenny Uglow, published at the end of last year:

Click the cover to find this book on Amazon.
I have never read a biographical work by Uglow before. She has written so many that I had rather come to regard her as a ‘professional biographer’ who wrote her stories to a very high documentary standard but did so for no particular personal reasons and never got involved much with her subjects. Indeed, she was quoted by Susie Boyt in an article entitled ‘The Experience of Writing a Biography’ (Financial Times 6 June 2009) as saying:
I’m so conscious that it’s dangerous to think of your subject as a friend or to over-identify. It would be completely bonkers to think you could actually get close to them. Liking is dangerous, loving is dangerous because, of course, it will change the way you see things. I hate the idea of things being soppy.
Quite. Thus we get a meticulously informed, densely documented, superbly illustrated, fast-moving account of Lear’s family, youth and early work as a zoological painter that absorbs us and bears us along until…in my case about page 200. At that point I asked myself, where is this going? There had been a minimum of speculation about why Lear’s life was thus — in particular, so restless — what his real ambitions were, what his sexuality was, how good his contemporaries actually thought him as an artist. The impression of motion over substance in Mr Lear: A Life of Art and Nonsense is enhanced by the fact that the chapters are short and there are over forty of them.
But I am so glad I persisted, and I recommend others to. All at once I realised that the reason Uglow’s treatment of Lear’s rejection by his mother, his epilepsy, his relationship with Frank Lushington, his on/off interest in Gussie Bethell, his obsession with memory and the past, his relationship with his lifelong servant Georgio, or with Tennyson, or with Foss his cat, is so, well, unexplicit, so discontinuous, so pointilliste, is not that she doesn’t want to probe or pry, but that she understands these problems of Lear’s so well. Gradually, cumulatively, we understand the complexity of Lear’s relationships too. Beneath Uglow’s low authorial intervention, beneath her ‘restraint’, there must be a profound empathy for her to be able to leave us understanding them so well.
Nevertheless, I have to say that the narrative spine here is too weak for me at times to think of it as biography. After you have followed Lear from Britain to Italy, from here to there by steamer, back to Italy, back again to Britain, per Bradshaw’s all over Britain, back to Corfu, or wherever, several times, you yearn for a bit of generalisation and personal interpretation. Again, you want to know what the biographer makes of it all.
Uglow, or Faber, have got round this problem in a most ingenious way. Every chapter is headed by a Lear drawing and limerick, Lear’s verse and accompanying drawings thickly bestrew the text, and every so often there is a fabulous reproduction of one of Lear’s mind-blowing watercolours or oils. Throughout, Uglow quotes Lear’s poetry and letters copiously. Without wishing to sound cynical, one can only describe this as a marketing masterstroke. It means that Mr Lear: A Life of Art and Nonsense is really a burgeoning Lear compendium, a grandiflora of all that’s best in Lear, the finest Lear Experience for the uninitiated that has ever been confected.
I instinctively feel this ploy detracts from the book as biography, but I cannot deny that it ends by making you feel you know Edward Lear as well as it is, probably, possible to know him. I stress: this is the achievement of Uglow and Lear, of the two authors in their own mysterious dialogue. You end by feeling you know the vulnerable, kind, despairing, hilarious, indignant, rebellious, supremely tolerant and civilised man who had an impossibly modern sense of beauty, who gave endlessly of his time to children and their parents alike, who worked like a Trojan. And to know Mr Lear is extremely pleasant.

George Calderon and the gender pay gap
Obviously I believe George Calderon’s life is interesting in itself — dramatic, even — but another reason I have written his biography is that many of the issues of the day that he responded to are still with us (e.g. Russian autocracy, the power of trade unions, commercial theatre, public philanthropy), and his take on them was original. Despite his reputation as a Tory (which he wasn’t), George never belonged to an Establishment, political, theatrical, literary, or other. He always strove to think outside the box.
His opposition to votes for women brought out the worst in him. However, since his reasoning, like that of the women anti-suffragists, was essentially based on gender difference (the ‘separate spheres’ argument) and gender differences are still with us, even here he can be relevant, or at least challenging, today.
One of the suffragists’ claims was that enfranchisement would raise women’s wages because it would raise their status (yes, it was italicised as a Latin word and presumably pronounced with a long ‘a’). Correspondence about this erupted on the pages of The Times in April 1909 and George weighed in with a very long letter, which was printed in full presumably because he put ‘Hon. Sec. Men’s League for Opposing Woman Suffrage’ after his name. He treated the wages claim with his malignest sarcasm:
What George was driving at was that the suffragists could not explain the economic mechanism by which enfranchisement would close the gender pay gap, and in the absence of that it wasn’t going to happen. One of George’s many qualifications was that, unusually for the time, he had studied ‘political economy’, i.e. what today we call ‘economics’. He consequently thought he knew what he was talking about. Indeed, very slyly in his anti-suffrage tract of the previous year he had pointed out that Millicent Fawcett, president of the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies, was a trained economist and could ‘prick the wages bubble in a moment’. He had also ‘searched Mrs Fawcett’s Political Economy for Beginners in vain for any hint that legislation is one of the possible means of raising wages’. He in fact believed, like a French economist who had studied the subject in 1906, that ‘the cause of women’s low wages lies chiefly in the competition of women for whom the wage is a supplement and not a livelihood’. The economic mechanism, then, that would perpetuate the gender pay gap was, in the words of his Times letter of 13 April 1909, ‘the market value of women’s work’.
The title page of George’s anti-suffrage tract
As we know only too well from the recently published statistics, enfranchisement and equal rights won by women since George’s day have not led to equal pay for women. So was he right about the role of invidious market forces? Yes, and no.
The current public debate about the gender pay gap demonstrates how complex the subject is. To take three of the simpler aspects, are we talking of a gender pay gap for doing exactly the same job, or of some kind of aggregate gap, does anyone have ‘equal’ pay given the existence of performance-related increments, and are the figures for gender pay gaps based on gross pay or income net of tax and benefits?
One thing that men in their right mind seem to have agreed on for centuries is that it is inequitable, insupportable, and indeed incomprehensible, that women should be paid less for doing the same job:
So neither Boswell, nor Johnson, nor ‘anyone else’ in that Age of Reason, could explain why the gender pay gap existed! Since they were men of reason, the implication is that they concluded it was the result of a perverse prejudice. And, of course, that is the short answer. But what still escapes us, it seems, is the substance of this prejudice. What specifically is it that men object to in their women colleagues that even drives employers to break the law about equal pay and the minimum wage?
Here George’s defence of ‘market forces’ can perhaps enlighten us. He was right, and the suffragists who expected enfranchisement to raise women’s pay in a market economy were wrong. But what are the forces that determine the ‘market value of women’s work’? Having identified the economic mechanism, George seems to think he has found an irrefutable, perhaps even objective, explanation of the gender pay gap. But we know perfectly well that there are a host of market forces that are purely psychological — and hence open to prejudices. George himself inadvertently identified one such prejudice, when he wrote that for women ‘the wage is a supplement and not a livelihood’.
In Edwardian Britain, as another Times correspondent pointed out, this statement was literally true, because ‘as the law now stands, a man is bound to bear the whole charge of supporting the family’. Quite possibly, therefore, a woman’s wage was regarded by everyone, including the women themselves, as a ‘supplement’, and competition between the women for a limited number of jobs did drive down the ‘market value’ of their work.
It is a long time since a woman’s salary was just a ‘supplement’ to the family income. However, even though more women are financially independent than ever before, and even though it is an official and legislative truth that they are equal to men, I believe the idea that their income is a ‘supplement’ still lurks in the male psyche. I have been self-employed for most of my life, but whenever I worked in large teams or offices I sensed a perception, perhaps even amongst some women, that they were ‘dilettantes’ at work because, as one male expressed it to me, ‘women can have children and men cannot, so of course they put children before everything else, whereas men have only work to put before everything else’. The implication was that women were only working until their maternity leave kicked in, whereupon they would rush off to do what they were really interested in, and meanwhile could not even be expected to work as hard as men.
I hasten totally to dissociate myself from such views, but we are trying to explain something that is widely thought to be almost an enigma in modern liberal society and I feel George has inadvertently identified the chief prejudice beneath it. The ‘supplement’ prejudice is the market force that produces the income differential when men and women are doing the same job (e.g. in the BBC).
The deeper question then is, why do men persist in the ‘supplement’ prejudice? There can be no rational excuse, but I suggest it is simply because our brains are programmed by gender difference, in this case bearing/not bearing children. Gender difference, as George realised when he considered the fact that most women in 1908 did not want the vote, plays havoc with the equality project. I think this is now being increasingly recognised. A correspondent in The Guardian of 2018, for instance, presents it as a fact that ‘many women prefer jobs aimed at looking after individual people, rather than committing their energy to playing the organisation game’, thus excluding themselves from higher-paid jobs open to them. That fine feminist and anti-suffragist Octavia Hill would have understood.